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Abstract. Euratom safeguards was the first international safeguards organisation having to cope with 
nuclear material safeguards in huge industrial scale reprocessing facilities. The four plants in the UK 
(Magnox, Thorp) and France (UP2, UP3) were built in two sites. Thorough analysis concluded that sampling 
is needed; the transport of the samples to a central Euratom laboratory should be avoided. It was decided to 
establish laboratories on the site of Sellafield and La Hague. These laboratories were opened about ten years 
ago and have been working continuously. They are staffed by experts of the Institute for Transuranium 
Elements, JRC-ITU, at Karlsruhe. ITU staff is present on-site for more than 40 weeks per year, ensuring a 
continuous flow of samples and of results.  The laboratories receive samples from all the plants on the 
respective sites, with input solution, plutonium products (including mixed oxides) and inventory samples 
being the most important type of material. The criteria for selection of the measurement methods for these 
samples are based on a combination of highest possible accuracy and a minimum of resource consumption. 
The data can be used for direct comparison with the operator’s results and they allow an evaluation of the 
material flows and material balance in a timely manner. The paper will give an overview of 10 years of 
operation of the laboratories.  Emphasis will be on analytical techniques, measurement uncertainties, and on 
the renovation of measurement equipment, which is becoming a serious issue after ten years of operation. The 
first major equipment replacement carried out now is the exchange of a mass spectrometer at the Sellafield 
laboratory. The safeguards impact will be discussed, and the lessons learned and the way forward will be 
presented. 
1. Introduction 
 
Independent analysis of samples forms a cornerstone in a traditional and strengthened safeguards approach. 
Sample analysis is essential to verify that no diversion of nuclear materials under safeguards has occurred and 
to periodically verify the operator's measurement systems. With the conversion of UP2 to UP2-800 in La 
Hague, France and the construction of UP3 (La Hague) and THORP (Sellafield, UK) some twenty years ago, 
the commercial civil reprocessing capacity in the European Union increased substantially. The amount of 
samples to be analysed for bias defect verification surpassed the analytical capacity of the available 
instrumentation of the central off-site laboratory of the European Commission (EC). A thorough analysis 
revealed that effective and efficient safeguards at a reprocessing plant would necessitate an on-site analytical 
laboratory (OSL) to analyse samples for plutonium and uranium content by destructive and non-destructive 
assay (DA and NDA). The benefits of an OSL are the following: 
• Timely analytical results, with an accuracy equal to that of an off-site laboratory 
• More straightforward re-verification possibilities due to the availability of spare sample aliquots 
• Improved control of samples and continuity of knowledge with reduced possibilities for tampering 
• Waste can be recycled to the plants' process stream with the possibility of recuperation of excess 
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sample 
• Cost reduction since sample shipments for off-site analysis are avoided 
• Easier handling of sample aliquots from dissolver liquors 
 
After several years of conception, planning, development and construction, the OSL in Sellafield (OSL-SEL) 
was officially opened in October 1999 [1] soon to be followed by the OSL in La Hague (OSL-LH) in June 
2010 [2, 3]. The laboratories are owned by the Safeguards Directorate of the Directorate General for Energy 
(DG ENER, Luxembourg) and are operated by analysts of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) Institute for 
Transuranium Elements (ITU) at Karlsruhe, Germany.  
 
2. Laboratory Capabilities 
 
The on-site laboratories are integrated within the buildings of the reprocessing plants. They are run under the 
operator's site licence and can make full use of supporting services. They have to comply with all the site 
safety, operating, and security rules. Staff of the OSLs must be trained under the existing (and future) site 
regulations and must comply with the same rules as the operator's staff. 
The initial concept, developed and tested at ITU, had to be adapted early on to accommodate site specific 
requirements and modalities and to reduce the overall foreseeable running costs [4]. During the 10 years of 
operating the laboratories, its analytical procedures were further improved and streamlined for higher 
effectiveness and efficiency.  
Although different, both OSLs share the same measurement approach and submit all samples first to 
radiometric assay method, with a subset being submitted to an independent primary assay method involving 
mass spectrometry. The latter offers the smallest possible measurement uncertainty and is used to assure the 
quality, independence, and traceability of the routine radiometric measurements and is further used to 
calibrate the radiometric methods and to resolve operator – inspector differences.  
 
2.1 Organisation of the laboratories 
 
The on-site laboratories are operated by ITU staff through weekly missions of teams with typically 2-4 
analysts.  The total number of mission weeks (both OSLs combined) is about 300 per year. There is an almost 
continuous flow of samples and analyses throughout the year. The analysts perform the analytical work, but 
also assume managerial and safety related responsibilities. 
The variety of sample types and the complexity of the measurement tasks demand a team of analysts with 
complementary skills. In the original concept up to four analysts were foreseen to be present in each of the 
OSLs. The number of analysts needed in the OSLs depends on the sample workload, the number of non-
standard samples requiring extra manipulations and measurements and the need for instrument maintenance. 
Through streamlining of procedures and increase in efficiency, the average number of analysts on-site has 
been reduced within the first two years of operation to about 2-4 per week while maintaining the high number 
of analysed samples with a constant high quality. 
In the laboratory, the analysts have well-defined tasks and responsibilities, and are expected to work as a 
team complementing each other’s skills.  The fact that only a small team of analysts is present on-site, 
performing highly specific tasks without the presence of senior specialists requires the analysts to be trained 
to a high level. In addition, the plant operators request compulsory training on site-specific regulations. The 
quality assurance system, in line with the requirements of the ISO 17025 norm, contains an elaborate system 
of information transfer, from one week to the other, from one analyst to the other. Maintaining continuity of 
knowledge of the work remains a challenge.  
 
2.2 Analytical Methods 
 
From experience gained by the Safeguards inspectorate and ITU it was decided to rely on radiometric 
methods such as K-edge densitometry (KED), X-ray fluorescence (XRF) and its combination in the hybrid K-
edge (HKED), and high resolution gamma spectrometry (HRGS) for uranium and plutonium element assay 
and for isotopic composition determination [5, 6, 7]. All samples are measured using these techniques. The 
development of a sample changer for the HKED has led to the possibility to measure several samples batch 
wise unattended. The K-edge and XRF instruments need a series of carefully characterized solutions of 
uranium and/or plutonium to establish a calibrated instrument response. These solutions, in turn, are 
characterized by Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry (IDMS).  
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IDMS is a primary method traceable to internationally accepted reference materials when using an 
appropriate spike and can obtain uncertainties better than 0.1 %. A sub-set of one in ten samples in the OSLs 
is analysed using IDMS. This method serves a double purpose: 
• An analytical purpose, i.e. for the detection of possible biases in the radiometric methods and 
• A safeguards purpose, i.e. for bias defect detection. 
In case of operator – OSL differences IDMS is used on the reserve sample to resolve discrepancies.  
 
2.2.1 Energy-dispersive X-ray Techniques 
 
The X-ray techniques, including KED and XRF, are somewhat less accurate compared to primary IDMS but 
provide a number of practical advantages such as speed of analysis, reduced handling of radioactive samples, 
and reduction of analytical wastes. A combination of KED and K-XRF for enhanced measurement versatility 
can be easily realised because both techniques utilise the same basic equipment [8, 9, 10].  
The optimum concentration range for precise K-edge densitometry lies between 50 and 350 g/l. Uncertainties 
of 0.2 % or better can be assured provided that strict procedures for measurement control are applied.  
For lower concentrations XRF is favoured. For single element solutions absolute concentration measurements 
are made. Uncertainties between 0.5 and 1 % are achievable. Better uncertainty levels can be obtained for 
lower plutonium concentration in the case of uranium and plutonium bearing samples. In the HKED the K-
XRF assays the U/Pu atom ratio, while the K-edge provides an accurate assay of the concentration of the 
major element (uranium). The combination of both measurements then also delivers an accurate result for the 
minor element plutonium with typical concentration levels of 1 to 2 g/L in reprocessing input samples 
containing typically 200 gU/L. HKED is also immediately applicable to MOX product material containing 
typically 90—95 % U and 10—5 % Pu. The measurement accuracy for the major element is typically 0.2 %, 
while, depending on the U/Pu ratio, the minor element can be measured to an accuracy ranging from 0.3—
0.65 %.   
 
2.2.2 Mass Spectrometry 
 
Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) is used to measure the uranium and plutonium isotopic 
compositions by total evaporation which requires only nanogram quantities of either uranium or plutonium 
and exhibits negligible mass fractionation effects during sample vaporisation [11]. Pure uranium solutions 
can be directly deposited on the filaments after adjusting the concentration to a value of about 100 ng/µl. 
Plutonium and U/Pu solutions require separations before filament preparation, since 241Am and 241Pu, as well 
as 238Pu and 238U give isobaric interferences. To determine the 238Pu abundance, α-spectrometry is still the 
most precise method since isobaric interference with 238U cannot be excluded even after separation of 
uranium and plutonium. A separation method based on Eichrom® Uteva was developed and is in current use 
[12, 13].  
In order to determine uranium and Plutonium mass fractions isotope dilution is performed using Large-Sized 
Dried Spikes (LSD), e.g., batch 1027 from IRMM [14]. The IRMM 1027 spikes contain about 2 mg of 
plutonium with 98 % 239Pu and about 50 mg U enriched in 235U just below 20 %.  The spikes are shipped in 
penicillin vials, each with an individual certificate stating the isotopic composition of both elements and the 
uranium and plutonium element content with a relative expanded uncertainty of 0.010 % and 0.04 %. These 
spikes are traceable to international standards. The radiometric methods are also traceable after calibration 
when using prepared calibration solutions that are subsequently characterized by IDMS. The element content 
of the LSD IRMM 1027 is such that typical input solutions analysed in the OSL-LH by IDMS need no pre-
dilution. Figure 1 exemplifies the achievable repeatability and intermediate term reproducibility in plutonium 
element assay in 2008.  
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Figure 1 Plutonium normalised mass fraction obtained from measurements of input solutions performed in 
2008.  LCL and UCL are the Lower and Upper Control Limits, ITV are the International Target Values [15]. 
 
3. Experience 
 
The OSLs perform verification measurements on samples taken from all stages of the reprocessing process. 
The samples are taken under direct control of Safeguards inspectors or by automatic sampling processes. The 
number of samples received is governed by the throughput of the reprocessing facility. After arrival of the 
samples an element assay and a density measurement are performed within the same week. Mass 
spectrometry results are generally available one week after sample reception. At least 15 days are necessary 
for PuO2 isotopic measurements by gamma spectrometry, in order to obtain detectable levels of the daughter 
nuclide 241Am (a requirement for reliable spectrum analysis).  
According to the IAEA INFCIRC/153 analytical measurements used for accountancy control “shall either 
conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards” [16]. Because of 
the large throughput of nuclear material in reprocessing plants, the analytical accuracy must match the state-
of-the-art. The objective for the OSLs is therefore to keep within the ESARDA target values [15], which is in 
fact achieved under daily operation conditions. Elaborate quality assurance, including internal and external 
quality control proved to be the best means to comply with the requirements.  
The measurements carried out in the OSLs are subject to quality control measures which are in line with 
international standards [17]. Quality control measures are grouped in five independent levels (instrument 
operation, procedural accuracy, duplicate sample measurements with comparison to reference materials, 
permanent method intercomparison, and external quality control) and assure a comprehensive check of all 
measurement results produced. No result of a sample analysis can be sent to the Inspectorate if the first three 
levels are not complied with. 
 
3.1 Sample Throughput 
 
During the 10 years of operation around 8200 samples have been received in the OSLs and about 21400 
measurements have been done to analyse them. Figure 2 gives the distribution over the individual years. 
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Figure 2: Number of samples received in the OSLs from 2000 to 2009 
  
3.2 Measurement Uncertainty 
 
The data obtained through the quality control system are used to estimate the measurement uncertainty.  A 
combined uncertainty is calculated from the best estimates of the overall precision and bias, and from the 
uncertainty of the reference material used. Where possible the reference materials are either Certified 
Reference Materials (CRMs) or in-house materials calibrated against a certified spike material.  
The uncertainties obtained under routine conditions depend on various factors, such as the operational 
conditions and the practical implementation of the methods. At both OSLs, uncertainties are within the 
International Target Values (ITV) [15] except for specific exceptional cases. This is an important milestone 
for the accountancy of nuclear material at large-scale nuclear facilities.  
The OSLs take part in the external quality control programme EQRAIN organised by CETAMA (CEA 
Marcoule, France) for element assay [18]. Uranium and plutonium solutions are analysed "blindly" with all 
applicable analytical methods. The result of the default analytical technique is sent to CETAMA, the results 
of the other analytical techniques are used for internal quality control. Figure 3 shows EQRAIN measurement 
results of a number of participating laboratories which used various analytical techniques. The data of the 
OSLs were obtained by K-edge densitometry and are well within the International Target Values. The 
successful participation in the external quality control programme confirms the proper operation of the 
internal quality control scheme. 
 
About 8200 samples 21400 measurements 
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Figure 3: Results of an EQRAIN quality control programme for uranium, underpinning the performance of 
the On-Site Laboratories. The data of the OSL-SEL (OSL) and of the OSL-LH (LSS) were measured by K-
edge densitometry, uncertainties are 1 sigma.  Note that the uncertainties are intrinsically larger than the ones 
of other data points measured by mass spectrometry or titration. 
 
For the quality control of isotopic ratios the OSLs take part in the REIMEP round robin exercises [19]. This 
programme evaluates the capacity of the participating laboratories to measure the uranium isotopic ratios in 
four uranium solutions ranging from depleted to low enriched uranium. 
 
4. Evaluation of Safeguards Benefits 
 
The role of the OSLs is to verify the operator’s declaration on amounts of nuclear material received, on stock 
or being transferred between different areas of the facility. A main advantage of performing these analyses 
on-site is the timely availability of measurement results. Samples taken by the operator for accountancy 
purposes are normally duplicated by parallel samples taken under supervision of an inspector for verification 
purposes. This safeguards sample is handled maintaining continuity of knowledge and analysed by an 
independent laboratory, i.e. the on-site laboratory. This allows the Inspectorate to draw independent 
Safeguards conclusions. Data evaluation is then performed in different ways in order to ensure consistency of 
information and to verify (quantitatively) correctness of declaration. One of the primary tools for evaluation 
consists in a paired comparison between operator’s and inspector’s results on every sample, allowing an 
immediate check on each tank, vessel, container or other key measurement points within the facility. As a 
consequence, the Inspectorate, as a result of the timely and accurate results obtained by the on-site laboratory, 
is in a position to independently verify the operator’s declaration at any time. 
 
5. Past and Future Challenges 
 
Advances, mainly in increasing the quality and the effectiveness, and consequently the efficiency of the on-
site laboratories, have been made in the course of their first 10 years of operation. A major advantage of the 
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OSLs is timeliness. This can only be guaranteed if timely repairs are possible or a redundant instrument or 
alternative method is available. With the limited lifespan of many instruments, maintenance or replacement 
has emerged as the next big challenge.  
Commercial equipment has been adapted to meet the requirements and constraints of the OSLs. The excellent 
assistance delivered by the workshop of ITU is greatly acknowledged in this respect. An example is the 
modification made for the solution density measuring cell. The density meter measures solution densities 
with very high accuracy by using a vibrating U-tube. The connection of external tubing to the measuring cell 
is extremely difficult to handle with master-slave manipulators as used in the OSL-LH. The design office and 
the workshop at ITU have developed and constructed a tubing connection that is easy to handle in a hot cell 
and that is resistant to high radiation levels (figure 4).  
 
 
 
Figure 4: External density measuring cell with ITU designed and manufactured tube connections 
 
A first major renovation exercise was the replacement of the air based cooling system of the X-ray tubes in 
the La Hague OSL. After several years of intensive operation with appropriate maintenance their capacity had 
dropped below the required level of sufficient cooling of the X-ray tubes. An improved system with water-
cooled chillers reducing substantially the risk of X-ray tube failure was installed.  
The first complete analytical instrument that needs to be exchanged is a TIMS mass spectrometer at OSL-
SEL. It is currently in the process of being dismantled and replaced by a state-of-the-art TIMS mass 
spectrometer. The replacement process in the industrial environment involving three parties is logistically 
challenging. Due to the presence of a second mass spectrometer in the OSL-SEL the influence on the 
continuity of the analyses has been limited.   
It is clear from the experience of the OSLs that maintenance and even decommissioning should be addressed 
already at the design stage. If appropriate, a modular design with exchangeable components and by using 
trained analysts timely repairs should be possible. Resources and, perhaps even more importantly, procedures 
and plans should be ready at hand for larger instrument replacements. Timeliness is at risk if no provisions 
are available to cope with major break downs. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The Safeguards scheme for large-scale reprocessing plants consists of a number of layers, involving 
compliance, performance, and credibility control. Direct physical verification of the nuclear material is 
fundamental to the ability for diversion detection. The high-quality, independent measurements performed by 
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the on-site laboratories play a crucial role in fulfilling this task. The on-site laboratories function 
independently of the operator, substantially reducing the overall costs and the logistical complexity related to 
nuclear material transports. 
The on-site laboratories have evolved into mature analytical laboratories where well trained, experienced and 
highly committed analysts, with support from ITU, perform consistently high quality measurements. The 
analytical results delivered are state-of-the-art and within the stringent International Target Values for 
measurement uncertainties. This is an important milestone for the accountancy of nuclear material at large-
scale nuclear facilities. 
The OSLs are facing a next phase where they will have to deal with the renovation and the replacement of 
equipment. It is clear that the dialog and co-operation between all concerned parties is mandatory for the
success of this process.  
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